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Abstract
A new concept for TU-values, called value dividends, is introduced. Similar to Harsanyi
dividends, value dividends are defined recursively and provide new characterizations of
values from the Harsanyi set. In addition, we generalize the Harsanyi set where each
of the TU-values from this set is defined by the distribution of the Harsanyi dividends
via sharing function systems and give an axiomatic characterization. As a TU value
from the generalized Harsanyi set, we present the proportional Harsanyi payoff, a new
proportional solution concept. As a side benefit, a new characterization of the Shapley
value is proposed. None of our characterizations uses additivity.
Keywords TU-game · Value dividends · (Generalized) Harsanyi set ·Weighted Shap-
ley values · (Proportional) Harsanyi payoff · Sharing function systems
1. Introduction
The concept of Harsanyi dividends was introduced by Harsanyi (1959). They can be
defined inductively: the dividend of the empty set is zero and the dividend of any other
possible coalition of a player set equals the worth of the coalition minus the sum of all divi-
dends of proper subsets of that coalition. Hence, Harsanyi dividends can be interpreted as
“the pure contribution of cooperation in a TU-game” (Billot and Thisse, 2005). Harsanyi
could show that if the Harsanyi dividends of all possible coalitions are spaced evenly
among its members, each player’s payoff equals the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b). The
weighted Shapley values (Shapley, 1953a) distribute the Harsanyi dividends proportion-
ally to players’ personal given weights. The ratio of the weights of two players is equal for
all coalitions containing them. However, sometimes this seems unrealistic. For example,
in some coalitions, the influence of one of two players on the other players may be higher
than in other coalitions with other players. Hammer et al. (1977) and Vasil’ev (1978)
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2proposed the Harsanyi payoffs1 which take this into account. There the players’ weights,
assigned to the Harsanyi dividends via a sharing system, can differ for all coalitions.
Myerson (1980) introduced the balanced contributions axiom which allows, along with
efficiency, an elegant axiomatization of the Shapley value. It states for two players i and
j that j contributes as much to i’s payoff as i contributes to j’s payoff. The w-balanced
contributions properties, the ratio of two players’ payoffs is proportional to their weights,
joint with efficiency, characterize the TU-values of an interesting class (Myerson, 1980).
These values coincide with the weighted Shapley values (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989).
So far, no analogous characterization to the above-mentioned characterization of the
weighted Shapley values is known for the Harsanyi payoffs. To enable corresponding
axiomatizations for the Harsanyi payoffs, we present a new concept, called ”value divi-
dends.” These are defined inductively: the value dividend of a singleton is the player’s
payoff in a single-player game and the value dividend of any (non-empty) other coalition
to a player represents that player’s payoff in the game on the player set of this coalition
minus all value dividends to that player in all subgames. We can therefore regard a value
dividend as the “pure” payoff to a player that has not yet been realized in a subgame.
Similar to the w-balanced contributions properties, we introduce an axiom called λ-
balanced value dividends where λ is a sharing system. If λ has the characteristic that
the ratio of two players sharing weights is equal in all coalitions containing them, then,
surprisingly, the λ-balanced value dividends property is equivalent to the w-balanced
contributions property.
The value dividends allow further axiomatizations of the Harsanyi payoffs and lead to
an extension of the Harsanyi set: we provide an axiomatization of the class of generalized
Harsanyi payoffs, called generalized Harsanyi set. These values are generally no longer
additive and use sharing function systems to distribute the Harsanyi dividends. A cen-
tral property of all TU-values, discussed in this paper, is the inessential grand coalition
property. This property states that in games where the Harsanyi dividend of the grand
coalition is zero a players’ payoff in the subgames determines the player’s payoff.
The generalized Harsanyi set allows proportionality principles in allocation. A common
consensus of most proportional sharing rules is the proportional standardness property for
two-player games (Ortmann, 2000), which means that the whole must be divided propor-
tionally to the singleton worths of both players. For more than two players, however, there
is absolutely no agreement on how proportionality should be applied. Many possibilities
are suggested such as the set-valued proper Shapley value (Vorob’ev and Liapunov, 1998;
van den Brink et al., 2015) where proportionality is stated by a fixed point argument.
Whereas, as single-valued solutions, the proportional rule (Moriarity, 1975) and, as a
value from the generalized Harsanyi set, the proportional Shapley value (Gangolly, 1981;
Besner, 2016; Be´al et al., 2018) consider only the worths of the singletons as weights, the
proportional value (Feldman, 1999; Ortmann, 2000) uses the worths of all coalitions in a
recursive formula. As a new representative of the generalized Harsanyi set, we introduce
the proportional Harsanyi payoff that also involves for calculating the whole coalition
function for a sharing function system in a recursive formula.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries. In Sect. 3,
we define the concept of value dividends, present a new characterization of the Harsanyi
set via efficiency and λ-balanced value dividends and contrast w-balanced contributions
1These TU-values are also known as Harsanyi payoff vectors, sharing values, or Harsanyi solutions.
3with λ-balanced value dividends. In Sect. 4, we introduce the inessential grand coalition
property that is crucial for the remainder of the article and propose an axiomatization
of the Harsanyi payoffs and of the Harsanyi set as a whole. In Sect. 5, we generalize
the Harsanyi set and give a class characterization. In Sect. 6, the proportional Harsanyi
payoff is defined and axiomatized, and the domain, the value, and reasonable axioms
are illustrated using an example. Section 7 concludes and discusses the results. Some
extensions of the Harsanyi and the generalized Harsanyi set are briefly presented and we
give a quick comparison of the proportional Harsanyi payoff with the Shapley value by
a new axiomatization of the Shapley value. Finally, the Appendix (Sect. 8) shows the
logical independence of the axioms in our characterizations.
2. Preliminaries
We denote by N the natural numbers, by R the real numbers, by R+ the set of all non-
negative real numbers, and by R++ the set of all positive real numbers. Let U be a
countably infinite set, the universe of all players. We define by N the set of all non-empty
and finite subsets of U. A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a
pair (N, v) with player set N ∈ N and a coalition function v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0. We
call each subset S ⊆ N a coalition, v(S) represents the worth of coalition S and we
denote by ΩS the set of all non-empty subsets of S. The set of all TU-games with player
set N is denoted by V(N), if v({i}) > 0 for all i ∈ N or if v({i}) < 0 for all i ∈ N , by
V0(N), and if all v(S) > 0 for all S ∈ ΩN, by V0+(N). The restriction of (N, v) to a
player set S ∈ ΩN is denoted by (S, v). An unanimity game (N, uS), S ∈ ΩN, is defined
for all T ⊆ N by uS(T ) = 1, if S ⊆ T , and uS(T ) = 0, otherwise; the null game (N,0N)
is given by 0N(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N .
Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ V(N). For all S ⊆ N the Harsanyi dividends ∆v(S)
(Harsanyi, 1959) are defined inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
0, if S = ∅, and
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), otherwise. (1)
A TU-game (N, v) is called almost positive if ∆v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2;
it is called totally positive (Vasil’ev, 1975) if ∆v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . We call a
totally positive TU-game game (N, v) strongly positive if v({i}) > 0 for all i ∈ N .
The set of all totally positive TU-games is denoted by V+(N), and the set of all strongly
positive TU-games by V++(N). A player i ∈ N is called a dummy player in (N, v) if
v(S∪{i}) = v(S)+v({i}) for all S ⊆ N\{i}. Two players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are symmetric
in (N, v) if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
We define by W := {f : U → R++}, wi := w(i) for all w ∈ W, i ∈ U, the collection of
all positive weight systems on U. The collection Λ of all sharing systems λ ∈ Λ on
4N is defined2 by
Λ :=
{
λ = (λN,i)N∈N , i∈N
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈N
λN,i = 1 and λN,i ≥ 0 for each N ∈ N and all i ∈ N
}
.
For all N ∈ N , a TU-value ϕ is an operator that assigns to any (N, v) ∈ V(N) a payoff
vector ϕ(N, v) ∈ RN.
For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and each w ∈ W , the (positively) weighted Shapley
Value Shw (Shapley, 1953a) is defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
The set of all weighted Shapley values is also known as Shapley set. A special case of a
weighted Shapley value, all weights are equal, is the Shapley value Sh (Shapley, 1953b),
given by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and i ∈ N.
Hammer et al. (1977) and Vasil’ev (1978) introduced independently a set of TU-values,
called Harsanyi set, also known as selectope (Derks et al., 2000). The payoffs are made
by distributing the Harsanyi dividends with the help of a sharing system. Each TU-value
Hλ, λ ∈ Λ, in this set, titled Harsanyi payoff, is defined by
Hλi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
λS,i∆v(S), for all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and i ∈ N. (2)
Obviously, the Shapley set is a proper subset of the Harsanyi set. The following TU-values
are not linear and are defined on subsets of V(N).
For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V0(N), the proportional rule pi (Moriarity, 1975) is given
by
pii(N, v) :=
v({i})∑
j∈N v({j})
v(N) for all i ∈ N (3)
and the proportional Shapley value Shp (Gangolly, 1981; Besner, 2016; Be´al et al.,
2018) is defined by
Shpi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
v({i})∑
j∈S v({j})
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (4)
2In our opinion, the definition of a weight system on the universe of all players (see, e. g., Casajus, 2018)
has some advantages in contrast to the definition on a fixed player set (see, e. g., Kalai and Samet, 1987),
especially if other player sets are regarded in such a way that identical players have the same weights in
different player sets. In order to have similar advantages for sharing systems, we define these systems
on the set of all finite subsets of the universe of all players and not on the set of all subsets of a fixed
player set as usually common.
5For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V0+(N), the proportional value P (Feldman, 1999; Ortmann,
2000) is defined inductively for all i ∈ S, S ⊆ N , by
Pi(S, v) :=

v({i}), if S = {i},
v(S)
1 +
∑
j∈S\{i}
Pj(S\{i}, v)
Pi(S\{j}, v)
, otherwise. (5)
We make use of the following axioms for TU-values ϕ:
Efficiency, E. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v) = v(N).
Dummy, D. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and i ∈ N such that i is a dummy player
in (N, v), we have ϕi(N, v) = v({i}).
Homogenity, H. For allN ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), i ∈ N, and α ∈ R, we have ϕi(N,αv) =
αϕi(N, v).
Monotonicity 3, M (Megiddo, 1974). For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and α ∈ R++, we
have ϕi(N, v + α · uN) ≥ ϕi(N, v) for all i ∈ N .
Symmetry, S. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and i, j ∈ N such that i and j are
symmetric in (N, v), we have ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v).
Balanced contributions, BC (Myerson, 1980). For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, we have ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N\{j}, v) = ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N\{i}, v).
w-balanced contributions, BCw (Myerson, 1980). For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈
V(N), i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and w ∈ W , we have
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N\{j}, v)
wi
=
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N\{i}, v)
wj
.
Proportional standardness, PSt (Ortmann, 2000). For all N ∈ N , {i, j} ⊆ N, i 6=
j, ({i, j}, v) ∈ V0(N), we have
ϕi({i, j}, v) = v({i})
v({i}) + v({j})v({i, j}).
Two further axioms follow which are satisfied by the proportional rule and the proportional
Shapley value. The first one states that a player’s payoff does not change if another player
splits into two new players who together make the same contribution to the game as the
original splitting player. We use the following definition.
Definition 2.1. Let N,N j ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), (N j, vj) ∈ V(N j), j ∈ N, k, ` ∈
U, k, ` /∈ N, N j = (N\{j}) ∪ {k, `}. The game (N j, vj) is called a corresponding
split player game to (N, v) if for all S ⊆ N\{j}
• vj({k}) + vj({`}) = v({j}),
• vj(S ∪ {i}) = vj(S) + vj({i}), i ∈ {k, `},
• vj(S ∪ {k, l}) = v(S ∪ {j}) and
3In Young (1985) this property is referred to as aggregate monotonicity.
6• vj(S) = v(S).
Player splitting, PSp (Besner, 2019). For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), j ∈ N, and
corresponding split player games (N j, vj) ∈ V(N j) to (N, v), we have ϕi(N, v) =
ϕi(N
j, vj) for all i ∈ N\{j}.
The last property in this section requires the definition of weakly dependent players who
are cooperatively productive only in coalitions that include all weakly dependent players.
Definition 2.2. Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ V(N). Two players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are
called weakly dependent in (N, v) if v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S) + v({k}), k ∈ {i, j}, for all
S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
Weakly dependent players should receive a payoff that is proportional to their singleton
worths.
Proportionality, P (Besner, 2019). For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V0(N), i, j ∈ N such that
i and j are weakly dependent in (N, v), we have
ϕi(N, v)
v({i}) =
ϕj(N, v)
v({j}) .
3. Value dividends
The Harsanyi dividend of a coalition S ⊆ N can be interpreted as the surplus of the worth
of the coalition S versus the sum of all the surpluses of the worths of all proper subsets
from S. Similarly, we define for a TU-value ϕ the value dividend Θϕi(S,v) of a coalition
S ⊆ N to a player i ∈ S as the additional payoff to player i in the subgame (S, v) versus
the sum of all additional payoffs to player i in all subgames (R, v), R ( S, R 3 i. In
detail, we have:
Definition 3.1. For all N ∈ N and each (N, v) ∈ V(N), S ⊆ N, i ∈ S, and TU-Value
ϕ, the value dividends Θϕi(S,v) are defined inductively by
Θϕi(S,v) :=
{
ϕi({i}, v), if S = {i},
ϕi(S, v)−
∑
R(S, R3i Θϕi(R,v), otherwise.
(6)
For efficient TU-values, value dividends have a connection to Harsanyi dividends.
Remark 3.2. Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ V(N). By (1), (6), and induction on the size
|S|, S ⊆ N , it is easy to show that we have for an efficient TU-value ϕ∑
i∈S
Θϕi(S,v) = ∆v(S) for all S ∈ ΩN.
3.1. λ-balanced value dividends
We formulate a new axiom for TU-values ϕ which is related to w-balanced contributions.
7λ-balanced value dividends, BVDλ. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), i, j ∈ N, and
λ ∈ Λ, we have λN, jΘϕi(N,v) = λN,iΘϕj(N,v).
The ratio of two players’ value dividends of the same coalition equals the ratio of the
players’ sharing weights if the weights and value dividends are not zero. It turns out that
a Harsanyi payoff Hλ is characterized by E and BVDλ.
Theorem 3.3. Let λ ∈ Λ. Hλ is the unique TU-value that satisfies E and BVDλ.
Proof. I. Let λ ∈ Λ. It is well-known that Hλ satisfies E. Thus, we have only to show
that Hλ meets BVDλ. By (2) and (6), we have ΘHλi (N,v) = λN,i∆v(N) for all i ∈ N and
all N ∈ N . Therefore, it is obvious that BVDλ is satisfied too.
II. Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), S ⊆ N, and let ϕ and φ be two arbitrary TU-values
which satisfy E and BVDλ. We show uniqueness by induction on the size |S|.
Initialization: If |S| = 1, uniqueness is satisfied by E.
Induction step: Let |S| ≥ 2. Assume that equality of the two values holds for all
S ′ ( S, |S ′| ≥ 1, and let |S| = |S ′|+ 1 (IH). Then equality of the value dividends of the
two values for all S ′ ( S holds too. Let j ∈ S such that λS, j 6= 0. A such j always exists.
By BVDλ, we have for all i ∈ S
Θϕi(S,v) =
λS,i
λS, j
Θϕi(S,v)
⇔
(6)
ϕi(S, v)−
∑
R(S,
R3i
Θϕi(R,v) =
λS,i
λS, j
[
ϕj(S, v)−
∑
R(S,
R3j
Θϕj(R,v)
]
(7)
and analogue
φi(S, v)−
∑
R(S,
R3i
Θφi(R,v) =
λS,i
λS, j
[
φj(S, v)−
∑
R(S,
R3j
Θφj(R,v)
]
. (8)
We subtract (8) from (7)
ϕi(S, v)− φi(S, v)−
∑
R(S,
R3i
Θϕi(R,v) +
∑
R(S,
R3i
Θφi(R,v)
=
λS,i
λS, j
[
ϕj(S, v)− φj(S, v)−
∑
R(S,
R3j
Θϕj(R,v) +
∑
R(S,
R3j
Θφj(R,v)
]
⇔
(IH)
ϕi(S, v)− φi(S, v) = λS,i
λS, j
[
ϕj(S, v)− φj(S, v)
]
. (9)
(9) holds for all i ∈ S. We obtain∑
i∈S
[
ϕi(S, v)− φi(S, v)
]
=
∑
i∈S
λS,i
λS, j
[
ϕj(S, v)− φj(S, v)
]
. (10)
By E, the left side of (10) equals zero. By induction, it follows ϕj(S, v) = φj(S, v) for all
j ∈ S and all S ⊆ N with λS, j 6= 0. By (9), we have ϕi(S, v) = φi(S, v) also for all i ∈ S
with λS,i = 0 and uniqueness is shown.
83.2. w-balanced contributions and λ-balanced value dividends
If players’ sharing weights in all coalitions are in the same ratio, a Harsanyi payoff coincides
with a weighted Shapley value. For such weights, the w-balanced contributions axiom can
be considered as a special case of the λ-balanced value dividends axiom.
Theorem 3.4. Let w ∈ W and λ ∈ Λ such that
λN,i :=
wi∑
j∈N wj
, for all N ∈ N , |N | ≥ 2, and i ∈ N. (11)
Then BVDλ is equivalent to BCw.
Proof. Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and let w and λ be defined as in
Theorem 3.4.
BVDλ ⇒ BCw: By BVDλ and (6), we have
ϕi(N, v)−
∑
S(N,
S3i
Θφi(S,v)
wi
=
ϕj(N, v)−
∑
S(N,
S3j
Θφj(S,v)
wj
⇔
ϕi(N, v)−
∑
S⊆N\{j},
S3i
Θφi(S,v) −
∑
S(N,
{i,j}⊆S
Θφi(S,v)
wi
=
ϕj(N, v)−
∑
S⊆N\{i},
S3j
Θφj(S,v) −
∑
S(N,
{i,j}⊆S
Θφj(S,v)
wj
⇔
(BVDλ)
ϕi(N, v)−
∑
S⊆N\{j},
S3i
Θφi(S,v)
wi
=
ϕj(N, v)−
∑
S⊆N\{i},
S3j
Θφj(S,v)
wj
⇔
(6)
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N\{j}, v)
wi
=
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N\{i}, v)
wj
.
BCw ⇒ BVDλ: We use induction on the size |N |.
Initialization: Let N = {i, j}. By BCw, we have
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N\{j}, v)
wi
=
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N\{i}, v)
wj
⇔
(6)
Θϕi(N,v)
wi
=
Θϕj(N,v)
wj
⇔
(11)
Θϕi(N,v)
λN,i
=
Θϕj(N,v)
λN, j
.
Induction step: Assume that the claim holds true for all player sets N ′, N ′ ( N, with
max
N ′(N
|N ′| ≥ 2 (IH). By BCw, we get
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N\{j}, v)
wi
=
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N\{i}, v)
wj
⇔
(6)
Θϕi(N,v) +
∑
S(N,
S3i
Θφi(S,v) −
∑
S⊆N\{j},
S3i
Θφi(S,v)
wi
9=
Θϕj(N,v) +
∑
S(N,
S3j
Θφj(S,v) −
∑
S⊆N\{i},
S3j
Θφj(S,v)
wj
⇔
(11)
Θϕi(N,v) +
∑
S(N,
{i,j}⊆S
Θφi(S,v)
λN,i
=
Θϕj(N,v) +
∑
S(N,
{i,j}⊆S
Θφj(S,v)
λN, j
⇔
(IH)
Θϕi(N,v)
λN,i
=
Θϕj(N,v)
λN, j
.
Since the claim holds for all N ∈ N , |N | ≥ 2, equivalence is shown.
By Theorem 3.4, the following axiom is equivalent to the w-weighted balanced contribu-
tions property.
w-weighted balanced value dividends, BVDw. For allN ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), i, j ∈
N, and w ∈ W , we have
Θϕi(N,v)
wi
=
Θϕj(N,v)
wj
.
Especially, the next property is equivalent to the balanced contributions property.
Balanced value dividends, BVD. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and i, j ∈ N, we
have
Θϕi(N,v) = Θϕj(N,v).
Therefore, by Theorems 3.4 and 3.3, we get a corollary that is equivalent to the well-known
axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values by efficiency and w-balanced contributions
in Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and, as a special case, of the Shapley
value by efficiency and balanced contributions in Myerson (1980).
Corollary 3.5. Let w ∈ W . Shw is the unique TU-value that satisfies E and BVDw. In
particular, Sh is the unique TU-value that satisfies E and BVD.
4. Inessential grand coalition
A TU-game (N, v) is called inessential if v(S) =
∑
i∈S v({i}) for all S ∈ ΩN. Note that
(N, v) is inessential if and only if v(S) =
∑
R(S ∆v(R) for all S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2. We weaken
this characteristic for games with at least two players so that the last condition must hold
only for the grand coalition: a TU-game (N, v), |N | ≥ 2, is called an inessential grand
coalition game if v(N) =
∑
S(N ∆v(S).
The grand coalition is inessential in the sense that v(N) is completely determined by
the worths of the proper subsets of N . The following new property for TU-values states
that in inessential grand coalition games a player’s payoff is completely determined by
the player’s payoff in all proper subgames.
10
Inessential grand coalition, IGC. For all N ∈ N and all inessential grand coalition
games (N, v) ∈ V(N), we have ϕi(N, v) =
∑
S(N,S3i Θϕi(S,v) for all i ∈ N.
To axiomatize the proportional Shapley value, Be´al et al. (2018) introduced an axiom
for two games which only differ in the worth of the grand coalition. Two players’ payoff
differentials must be proportional to their singleton worths.
Proportional (aggregate) monotonicity, PM (Be´al et al., 2018). For all N ∈ N ,
|N | ≥ 2, (N, v) ∈ V0(N), α ∈ R, and all i, j ∈ N, we have
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N, v + α · uN)
v({i}) =
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N, v + α · uN)
v({j}) .
Similarly, the following property requires that two players’ payoff differentials must be
proportional to their weights of a sharing system.
λ-balanced monotonicity, Mλ. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), i, j ∈ N, λ ∈ Λ, and
α ∈ R, we have
λN, j
[
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N, v + α · uN)
]
= λN,i
[
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N, v + α · uN)
]
.
Theorem 4.1. Let λ ∈ Λ. Hλ is the unique TU-value that satisfies E, IGC, and Mλ.
Proof. I. it is well-known that Hλ satisfies E and, by (2) and (6), it is clear that Hλ
meets IGC and Mλ and existence is shown.
II. For all N ∈ N , let (N, v) ∈ V(N), λ ∈ Λ, and let ϕ be a TU-value that satisfies E,
IGC, and Mλ. We show uniqueness by induction on the size |N |.
Initialization: If |N | = 1, uniqueness is satisfied by E.
Induction step: Let |N | ≥ 2. Assume that uniqueness holds for all N ′ ( N, |N ′| ≥ 1,
(IH). Let j ∈ N such that λN, j 6= 0. Note that such a j always exists and that
(N, v−∆v(N) ·uN) is an inessential grand coalition game. By Mλ, we have for all i ∈ N ,
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N, v −∆v(N) · uN) = λN,i
λN, j
[
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N, v −∆v(N) · uN)
]
⇒
∑
i∈N
[
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N, v −∆v(N) · uN)
]
=
∑
i∈N
λN,i
λN, j
[
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N, v −∆v(N) · uN)
]
.
By IGC and (IH), ϕi(N, v − ∆v(N) · uN) is unique for all i ∈ N . Therefore, by E, it
follows that ϕj(N, v) is unique for all j ∈ N with λN, j 6= 0. Thus, by Mλ, ϕi(N, v) is
unique for all i ∈ N with λN, i = 0 too and uniqueness is shown.
We would like to offer an axiomatic characterization of the Harsanyi set which does not
explicitly use the sharing function systems. The next property requires that the ratios of
two players’ payoff differentials in two different games on the same player set are equal,
especially if the payoff differentials are not zero.
Dependent value monotonicity, DVM. For all N ∈ N , (N, v), (N,w) ∈ V(N), i, j ∈
N, and α, β ∈ R, we have[
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N, v+α · uN)
][
ϕj(N,w)− ϕj(N,w + β · uN)
]
=
[
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N, v + α · uN)
][
ϕi(N,w)− ϕi(N,w + β · uN)
]
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We get an axiomatic characterization of the Harsanyi set.
Theorem 4.2. A TU-value ϕ satisfies E, M, DVM, and IGC iff there exists a λ ∈ Λ,
such that ϕ = Hλ.
Proof. I. Let λ ∈ Λ. It is well-known that Hλ satisfies E and M. By Theorem 4.1, Hλ
satisfies IGC and Mλ. It is obvious that Mλ implies DVM and thus existence is shown.
II. For all N ∈ N , let (N, v) ∈ V(N) and let ϕ be a TU-value that satisfies E, M,
DVM, and IGC. We show that ϕ = Hλ for some λ ∈ Λ. If |N | = 1, we have ϕ = Hλ
for all λ ∈ Λ by E. Let now |N | ≥ 2. By E and M, we have for all such N ∈ N and
all i ∈ N , ϕi(N, uN) − ϕi(N,0N) = cN,i ∈ R+ and
∑
i∈N cN,i = 1. Thus exists a λ ∈ Λ
with λN,i := cN,i for all N ∈ N , |N | ≥ 2, and all i ∈ N . By DVM, we get for all
N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), i, j ∈ N, all α ∈ R, and a λ ∈ Λ just defined,[
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N, v + α · uN)
]
cN,j =
[
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N, v + α · uN)
]
cN,i
⇔ λN, j
[
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N, v + α · uN)
]
= λN,i
[
ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N, v + α · uN)
]
.
Therefore, ϕ satisfies Mλ and, due to E, IGC, and Theorem 4.1, ϕ equals a Harsanyi
payoff Hλ with λ ∈ Λ.
5. The generalized Harsanyi set
Casajus (2017) introduced a class of TU-values ϕω, ω ∈ Ω, Ω := {f : R × U → R++},
defined by
ϕωi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
ω(v({i}), i)∑
j∈S ω(v({j}), j)
∆v(S) for all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and i ∈ N.
If ω does not depend on v, ϕω equals a weighted Shapley value. Therefore, we will call
the class of all TU-values ϕω the generalized Shapley set and we will denote each
value in that class by Shω for each ω ∈ Ω. This class obviously contains the weighted
Shapley values but also non-linear TU-values like the TU-values ϕc which are defined for
all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and all c > 0, by
ϕci(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
|v({i})|+ c∑
j∈S(|v({j})|+ c)
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (12)
Here the weight function depends on the worth of the singletons. In the following exten-
sions of the Harsanyi set the weights may depend on the entire coalition function.
Let V˜ := {v˜ : N ∪ {∅} → R, v˜(∅) = 0} and let for all v˜ ∈ V˜ , V(N , v˜) := {(N, vN) ∈
V(N)|N ∈ N and vN(S) = v˜(S) for all S ⊆ N} be the set of all TU-games (N, vN) ∈
V(N) on all player sets N ∈ N such that vN(S) = v˜(S) for all S ⊆ N and all N ∈ N .
Related to a TU-value, we define: for all N ∈ N , a sharing function ψN on N is
an operator that assigns to any (N, v) ∈ V(N) a sharing vector ψN(v) ∈ RN+ such that∑
i∈N ψ
N
i (v) = 1. For all v˜ ∈ V˜ , the collection Ψ(v˜) of all sharing function systems
ψ ∈ Ψ(v˜) is defined by
Ψ(v˜) :=
{
ψ =
(
ψNi (v
N)
)
N∈N , i∈N
∣∣ vN(S) = v˜(S) for all S ⊆ N and N ∈ N}.
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For each fixed v˜ or if the sharing functions are constants, a sharing function system
coincides with a sharing system. This leads to the naming of the following TU-values.
For all v˜ ∈ V˜ , all (N, v) ∈ V(N , v˜), and ψ ∈ Ψ(v˜), the generalized Harsanyi payoff
Hψ is defined by
Hψi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
ψSi (v)∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (13)
We call the class of all generalized Harsanyi payoffs generalized Harsanyi set. In the
next property the λ ∈ Λ in BVDλ will be replaced by a ψ ∈ Ψ(v˜).
ψ-balanced value dividends, BVDψ. For all v˜ ∈ V˜ , all (N, v) ∈ V(N , v˜), and ψ ∈
Ψ(v˜), we have ψN, jΘϕi(N,v) = ψN,iΘϕj(N,v).
The following theorem is completely analogous to Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 5.1. Let ψ ∈ Ψ(v˜), v˜ ∈ V˜. Hψ is the unique TU-value that satisfies E and
BVDψ.
The proof is omitted since it is straightforward to transfer the proof from Theorem 3.3.
We provide a characterization of the generalized Harsanyi set which does not use sharing
function systems explicitly. Here, the dependent value monotonicity property in Theorem
4.2 is dropped.
Theorem 5.2. A TU-value ϕ satisfies E, IGC, and M iff there exists for all v˜ ∈ V˜ a
ψ ∈ Ψ(v˜) such that ϕ = Hψ.
Proof. I. Let v˜ ∈ V˜ , (N, v) ∈ V(N , v˜), and ψ ∈ Ψ(v˜). By (13) and (6), it is clear that Hψ
satisfies E, IGC, and M.
II. Let (N, v) ∈ V(N) and ϕ a TU-value that satisfies E, IGC, and M. We show
uniqueness by induction on the size |N |.
Initialization: If |N | = 1, uniqueness is satisfied by E.
Induction step: Let |N | ≥ 2. Assume that uniqueness holds for all N ′ ( N, |N ′| ≥ 1,
(IH). Let (N,w) ∈ V(N) such that w(S) := v(S) for all S ( N and ∆w(N) := 0. Then,
by I., (IH), and IGC, we get ϕi(N,w) = H
ψ′
i (N,w) for all i ∈ N and some ψ′ ∈ Ψ(v˜) and
some v˜ ∈ V˜ such that (N,w) ∈ V(N , v˜). It follows, as a first case, ϕ(N, v) = Hψ′(N, v) if
v(N) = w(N).
If, as a second case, ∆v(N) > 0, we have, by E,∑
i∈N
ϕi(N, v) =
∑
i∈N
Hψ
′
(N,w) + ∆v(N).
By M, we get for all i ∈ N ,
ϕi(N, v) ≥ Hψ′i (N,w)
⇒ ϕi(N, v) = Hψ′i (N,w) + χi(N, v), χi(N, v) ≥ 0, and
∑
i∈N
χi(N, v) = ∆v(N)
⇒ ϕi(N, v) = Hψ′i (N,w) +
χi(N, v)∑
j∈N χj(N, v)
∆v(N) = H
ψ′
i (N,w) + ψ
N
i (v)∆v(N).
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ψN(v) is a sharing function and is part of a sharing function system ψ ∈ Ψ(v˜) with
ψS(v) = ψ′S(v) for all S ( N and sharing functions ψ′S(v) from a sharing function
system ψ′ ∈ Ψ(v˜). By (13), it follows
ϕi(N, v) = H
ψ
i (N, v) for all i ∈ N.
If ∆v(N) < 0, equality follows analogously.
6. The proportional Harsanyi payoff
It is clear that the TU-values ϕc from Sect. 5 and the proportional Shapley value Shp (on
a subset of all TU-games) are also part of the generalized Harsanyi set. One may ask,
whether the proportional value P is also a member of the generalized Harsanyi set (on
the relevant subset of TU-games). However, it is easy to show that this is not the case4.
Many scientific studies about the Harsanyi set deal with totally positive games (see,
e. g., Vasil’ev and van der Laan, 2002; van den Brink et al., 2014). Also the set-valued
proper Shapley value is defined on totally positive games5 by Vorob’ev and Liapunov
(1998). We introduce a new proportional TU-value from the generalized Harsanyi set,
defined on the subset of strictly positive games. It satisfies proportional standardness,
in harmony with other proportional TU-values as the proportional rule, the proportional
value, or the proportional Shapley value.
Definition 6.1. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V++(N), the proportional Harsanyi pay-
off Hp is defined inductively for all i ∈ S, S ⊆ N, by
Hpi (S, v) :=

v({i}), if S = {i},∑
R(S,R3i ΘHpi (R,v)∑
j∈S
∑
R(S,R3j ΘHpj (R,v)
v(S), otherwise.
(14)
Remarks 6.2. One easily shows, by Remark 3.2 and induction on the size |S|, that Hp
is well-defined. Moreover, we have Hpi (N, v) > 0 for all i ∈ N, (N, v) ∈ V++(N)6. By
(14), it is obvious that Hp satisfies E and PSt.
We present a formula for the proportional Harsanyi payoff that distributes the Harsanyi
dividends proportional to players’ value dividends and confirms the membership to the
Harsanyi set.
Proposition 6.3. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V++(N), we have
Hpi (N, v) = ∆v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N
S3i, S 6={i}
∑
R(S,R3i ΘHpi (R,v)∑
j∈S
∑
R(S,R3j ΘHpj (R,v)
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N. (15)
4 Let (N, v) ∈ V(N), N = {1, 2, 3}, be an inessential grand coalition game, given by v({1}) = v({2}) =
1, v({3}) = 2, v({1, 2}) = 4, v({1, 3}) = 3, v({2, 3}) = 5 and v({1, 2, 3}) = 8. We obtain P1(N, v) =
24
13 6= 2 =
∑
S(N ΘP1(N,v) and IGC is not satisfied.
5Van den Brink et al. (2015) generalized the proper Shapley value for monotone TU-games.
6This property is called positivity in Derks et al. (2000).
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Proof. If |N | = 1, the claim is obvious. Let now |N | ≥ 2. We have for all i ∈ N
∆v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
∑
R(S,R3i ΘHpi (R,v)∑
j∈S
∑
R(S,R3j ΘHpj (R,v)
∆v(S)
=
(1),E
Rem. 3.2
∆v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
∑
R(S,R3i ΘHpi (R,v)∑
j∈S
∑
R(S,R3j ΘHpj (R,v)
[
v(S)−
∑
R(S
∑
j∈R
ΘHpj (R,v)
]
=
(14)
∆v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
Hpi (S, v)−
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
∑
R(S,
R3i
ΘHpi (R,v)
=
(6)
∆v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
∑
R(S,
R3i
ΘHpi (R,v) −
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
∑
R(S,
R3i
ΘHpi (R,v)
=
(6)
Hpi (N, v).
For games which differ only in the grand coalition, the following axiom requires that
players’ payoffs remain in the same ratio.
Proportion preservation, PP. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and α ∈ R, we have
ϕi(N, v)ϕj(N, v + α · uN) = ϕj(N, v)ϕi(N, v + α · uN) for all i, j ∈ N.
As a consequence of the following axiom, each player’s share is independent of the worth
of the grand coalition.
Independent share, IS. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and α ∈ R, we have
ϕi(N, v)[v(N) + α] = ϕi(N, v + α · uN)v(N) for all i ∈ N.
This axiom implies, e. g., that if a positive worth of the grand coalition increases, while
the worths of all other coalitions remain fixed, then a players’ positive payoff increases
proportionally to the increase of the worth of the grand coalition.
Remark 6.4. It is clear that IS implies PP. One also easily checks that if a TU-value
satisfies E and PP, then it also satisfies IS.
Remark 6.5. Examination of (3), (5), and (14) shows that the proportional rule pi, the
proportional value P, and the proportional Harsanyi payoff Hp satisfy PP and IS, but,
by (4), this is not the case for the proportional Shapley value Shp.
The next axiom relates to the λ-balanced value dividends property: two players’ value
dividends of the grand coalition are in the same proportion as the payoffs if the value
dividends and the payoffs are not zero.
Value balanced value dividends, VBVD. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V(N), and i, j ∈
N , we have
ϕi(N, v)ΘHpj (N,v) = ϕj(N, v)ΘH
p
i (N,v)
. (16)
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Remark 6.6. By (6), (16) is equivalent to
ϕi(N, v)
∑
S(N,S3j
ΘHpj (S,v) = ϕj(N, v)
∑
S(N,S3i
ΘHpi (S,v).
Thus, VBVD also states that two players’ payoffs are in the same proportion as the
sums of players’ value dividends of all proper subsets of the grand coalition if the value
dividends and the payoffs are not zero. Note that VBVD holds for all games whereas PP
and IS need games which differ only in the grand coalition. The proportional Harsanyi
payoff matches VBVD and a lot of other properties.
Proposition 6.7. Let N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V++(N). Hp satisfies D, M, H, S, VBVD,
IGC, P and PSp.
Proof. Let (N, v) ∈ V++(N). It is well-known that we have for a dummy player i ∈ N
in (N, v), ∆v(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2, S 3 i. Thus, D follows immediately by (15)
and, also by (15), M is obviously satisfied. By induction on the size |N | and formula
(14) follows H. In addition, also as a well-known fact, we have for two symmetric players
i, j ∈ N in (N, v), ∆v(S ∪ {i}) = ∆v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N . Then, it is obvious, by (15),
that Hp satisfies S. By (14), we can see that Hp matches VBVD and, by Definition 3.1,
Remark 3.2, and E, obviously IGC is satisfied.
P: By Lemma 1 in Besner (2019), two players i, j ∈ N are weakly dependent in (N, v),
iff ∆v(S∪{k}) = 0, k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}, S 6= ∅. By (15), we have ΘHpi (S,v) = 0
for all S ⊆ N, S 3 i, such that ∆v(S) = 0. By induction on |N |, we show that
ΘHpi (S,v)
v({i}) =
ΘHpj (S,v)
v({j}) for all S ⊆ N, i, j ∈ S. (17)
Initialization: If |N | = 2, (17) is satisfied by (15) and (6).
Induction step: Let |N | ≥ 2. Assume that (17) is satisfied for all N ′ ( N, |N ′| ≥ 2,
(IH). Then, by (15) and (IH), we have,
Hpi (N, v) = ∆v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N,
S3i, S 6={i}
∑
R(S,R3i ΘHpi (R,v)∑
k∈S
∑
R(S,R3k ΘHpk (R,v)
∆v(S)
=
Lemma 1 in
Besner (2019)
v({i}) +
∑
S⊆N,
{i,j}⊆S
∑
R(S, {i,j}⊂R ΘHpi (R,v)∑
k∈S
∑
R(S, {i,j}⊂R ΘHpk (R,v)
∆v(S)
=
(IH)
v({i})
v({j})v({j}) +
v({i})
v({j})
∑
S⊆N,
{i,j}⊆S
∑
R(S, {i,j}⊂R ΘHpj (R,v)∑
k∈S
∑
R(S, {i,j}⊂R ΘHpk (R,v)
∆v(S)
=
v({i})
v({j})H
p
j (N, v).
Thus, (17) is satisfied and therefore Hp meets P as well.
The proof of PSp is omitted since, by (15) and induction on the size |S|, S ⊆ N , it is
straightforward to transfer the proof of Proposition 2 in Besner (2019) for Shp to Hp.
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Derks et al. (2000) could show that the Harsanyi set coincides for almost positive games
with the core. The core of a TU-game (N, v) ∈ V(N) is the set C(N, v) := {x ∈ RN :
x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ ΩN}. It is obvious, by E and (15), that it is a
necessary characteristic of the proportional Harsanyi payoff to be a member of the core.
This can be interpreted in such a way that no coalition of players can improve upon or
block the payoff.
Remark 6.8. For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈ V++(N), we have Hp(N, v) ∈ C(N, v).
We have three main results in this section. The first one is related to Theorem 3.3 and
shows that the value balanced value dividends axiom is a very strong property.
Theorem 6.9. Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ V++(N). Hp is the unique TU-value that
satisfies E and VBVD.
Proof. By Proposition 6.7 and Remarks 6.2, we have only to show uniqueness. Let
(N, v) ∈ V++(N) and let ϕ be a TU-value that satisfies E and VBVD. We use induction
on the size |S|, S ⊆ N .
Initialization: If |S| = 1, uniqueness of ϕ(S, v) is satisfied by E. Moreover, we have for
all T ⊆ N, |T | = |S|+ 1, ∑
S(T, S3i,
Θϕi(S,v) > 0. (18)
Induction step: Assume uniqueness and (18) hold for |S| − 1, |S| ≥ 2 (IH). Then, by
(IH), we have
∑
R(S,R3i, Θϕi(R,v) > 0. By (6), it follows for all i ∈ S and a fixed j ∈ S
ϕi(S, v) =
∑
R(S,R3i, Θϕi(R,v)∑
R(S,R3j, Θϕj(R,v)
ϕj(S, v)
⇔
∑
i∈S
ϕi(S, v) =
∑
i∈S
∑
R(S,R3i, Θϕi(R,v)∑
R(S,R3j, Θϕj(R,v)
ϕj(S, v).
Thus, by E and induction, ϕ is unique for all S ⊆ N and Theorem 6.9 is shown.
Our last theorem does not need efficiency.
Theorem 6.10. Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ V++(N). Hp is the unique TU-value that
satisfies D, IGC, and IS.
Proof. By Proposition 6.7, Remark 6.5, and Remarks 6.2, we have only to show unique-
ness. Let (N, v) ∈ V++(N) and let ϕ be a TU-value that satisfies D, IGC, and IS. We
use induction on the size |S|, S ⊆ N .
Initialization: If |S| = 1, uniqueness of ϕ(S, v) is satisfied by D.
Induction step: Assume uniqueness holds for |S| − 1, |S| ≥ 2 (IH). Then, by (IH), we
have
∑
R(S,R3i, Θϕi(R,v) is unique for all i ∈ S. Let (S,w) ∈ V++(S) such that ∆w(S) = 0
and v(R) = w(R) for all R ( S. By IGC, it follows ϕi(S,w) is unique for all i ∈ S. By
IS, we have for all i ∈ S
ϕi(S, v) =
v(N)
w(N)
ϕi(S,w).
and ϕ is unique for all S ⊆ N and Theorem 6.10 is shown.
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Remark 6.11. The proof shows that in Theorem 6.10 D can be replaced by any axiom
that guarantees that a players’ payoff in a singleton game is her worth and that is satisfied
by HP. Therefore, e. g., E or the inessential game property that states that a player in an
inessential game receives her singleton worth can be used instead of D.
We have a last characterization of the proportional Harsanyi payoff. It follows immediately
from Theorem 6.10 and Remarks 6.4 and 6.11.
Corollary 6.12. Let N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ V++(N). Hp is the unique TU-value that
satisfies E, IGC, and PP.
Remark 6.13. By (13), all values from the generalized Harsanyi set satisfy for all N ∈ N
on V++(N), E, D, and IGC. Thus, Hp is the unique value from the Harsanyi set that
satisfies PP and IS on V++(N).
The following example justifies the value and illustrates the axioms, used in Theorem 6.10
and Corollary 6.12.
Example
A group N of independent carpenters who are not too busy as a one-man business join
forces and work together in different groups S ⊆ N . The total quantity and size of the
orders depends on a number of external factors, such as the macroeconomic cycle, the
general interest rate level, the general state of the buildings and so on.
We assume that the share of each carpenter as a one-man company in the total net
profit of all one-man companies depends only on her performance. We also assume that
orders for larger coalitions depend only on the efficiency of the subgroups and whether
the customers receive good value for money from the subgroups. The order volume is not
too large, so that all orders, offered for groups of different sizes, can be executed.
We model the situation as a TU-game. Nobody cooperates with a carpenter who has
no net profit and therefore, does not work efficiently. Thus, we only regard the player sets
N with v({i}) > 0 for all players i ∈ N . The worth v(S) of a coalition S ⊆ N equals the
sum of all net profits of all subunits of S. The Harsanyi dividend ∆v(S) of coalition S
is equal to the net profit of the unit S, but only in cases where the players of S work as
a unit. Besides, the carpenters won’t pay on top. Therefore, we have ∆v(S) ≥ 0 for all
S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2, and (N, v) ∈ V++(N).
The carpenters must agree on how to share the worth of the grand coalition v(N). They
want to share the whole worth in such a way that E must be satisfied. The carpenters have
no way of deciding how to divide the net profit of a unit solely by the performance of the
unit itself. They can only take into account the profits of all subunits. Hence, the players’
shares on the grand coalition net profits do not depend on the grand coalition’s profit as
a single unit. The carpenters conclude that each player’s share should be independent of
the worth of the grand coalition and therefore IS must be satisfied. If a grand coalition
does not work as a unit, that unit’s net profit is zero. Thus, the carpenters agree that in
this case the payoff should be equal to the sum of players’ payoffs in all proper subunits.
Therefore, IGC should also be satisfied. Hence, by Theorem 6.10 and Remark 6.11,
the proportional Harsanyi value Hp is the method of choice for distributing the profits.
Certainly, the carpenters accept D, so that a carpenter who does not cooperate with
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partners in other units should only receive her one-man company result. The carpenters
can also conclude, that the payoff in the grand coalition unit should be proportional to
the sum of their payoffs in all other subunits and therefore agree, by Remark 6.6, that
VBVD should be satisfied. After some reflection, all the properties presented in this
section seem reasonable to the carpenters.
7. Conclusion and discussion
Most studied TU-values are efficient and a lot of them satisfy monotonicity. Thus, the
inessential grand coalition property can be used as a criterion whether such a value has
to be in the (generalized) Harsanyi set (see footnote 4).
The article shows a strong connection between values from the (extended generalized)
Harsanyi set and value dividends. Also the non-efficient Banzhaf value has a representa-
tion with dividends. For all N ∈ N and (N, v) ∈ V(N) the Banzhaf value β (Banzhaf,
1965) is given by
βi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
2|S|−1
for all i ∈ N.
Obviously, the Banzhaf value satisfies the inessential grand coalition property and mono-
tonicity. Thus, the superset of the generalized Harsanyi set that does not require efficiency
contains the Banzhaf value. This means that in the definition of a sharing function within
a sharing function system the condition
∑
i∈N ψ
N
i (v) = 1 for a sharing vector ψ
N(v) ∈ RN+
must be dropped. In Figure 1/Table 1, the class of these values is marked by ϕχ. However,
possible applications of value dividends for axiomatizations of the Banzhaf value are left
for further research.
Figure 1: The subset relationships between some classes of TU-values
ϕχ
+
− ϕχ
Hψ
+
− Generalized Harsanyi set Hψ
Multiweighted
Shapley values
MWSVλ
+
−
Harsanyi set Hλ
Generalized
Shapley set Shω
Shapley set Shw
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Table 1: Properties of some classes of TU-values7
Class Shw Shω Hλ MWSVλ
+
− Hψ Hψ
+
− ϕχ ϕχ
+
−
Efficiency + + + + + + – –
Null player + + + + + + + +
Inessential grand coalition + + + + + + + +
Homogenity + – + + – – – –
Additivity + – + + – – – –
Marginality (Young, 1985) + – + + – – – –
Monotonicity + + + – + – + –
Strong monotonicity (Young, 1985) + – + – – – – –
Weak balanced contributions (Casajus, 2017) + + – – – – – –
Dependent value monotonicity + – + + – – – –
If we drop in Theorem 4.2 the monotonicity property, we get an axiomatic characterization
of the multiweighted Shapley values8 MWSVλ
+
−(Dragan, 1992). A further removal of
the dependent value monotonicity or a removal of the monotonicity property in Theorem
5.1 respectively leads to the characterization of a new class of TU-values (in Figure 1/Table
1 denoted by Hψ
+
−). That means that we allow sharing vectors ψ
+
−N(v) ∈ RN such that∑
i∈N ψ
+
−N
i (v) = 1. Our last extension, represented in Figure 1/Table 1 by ϕ
χ+− , concludes
all mentioned classes of TU-values but not the proportional rule and not the proportional
Value. This is the class of all TU-values which satisfy the inessential grand coalition
property.
Also the TU-values from the Shapley mapping and thus the set-valued proper Shapley
value in Vorob’ev and Liapunov (1998) are part (on subsets) of the generalized Harsanyi
set (compare Equation (2) in Vorob’ev and Liapunov (1998) with (13)). Here, too, further
research must be shifted into the future.
The usage of the proportional Harsanyi payoff is restricted to strongly positive games.
This efficient TU-value combines the inessential grand coalition property of the propor-
tional Shapley value with the proportion preservation and independent share property
of the proportional rule and the proportional value. The sharing weights are given en-
dogenously and depend on the whole coalition function, not only on the worths of the
singletons as by the proportional rule or the proportional Shapley value. Thus, supported
by many convincing properties, this value is recommended if the worth of a coalition is
dependent from the worths of all subsets of the coalition.
Introducing the proportional value, Ortmann (2000) used similar characterization ap-
proaches to that of the Shapley value. In particular, he contrasted efficiency and his
preservation of ratios axiom with efficiency and the balanced contributions property and
standardness in two player games and consistency with proportional standardness and
consistency. An analogous proceeding we can see in Be´al et al. (2018) with the propor-
tional Shapley value and the Shapley value. For one such comparison, they introduced
the proportional monotonicity property and the following axiom.
7All properties of TU-values that are not mentioned in the article are known or easy to verify for the
TU-values from the listed classes.
8Obviously, (Dragan, 1992) had no knowledge of the Harsanyi set yet, so he showed that many well-
known solution concepts are multiweighted Shapley values, but the Harsanyi payoffs were missing. This
explains the naming ”multiweighted Shapley values” instead of, e. g., ”extended Harsanyi payoffs.”
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Equal (aggregate) monotonicity, EM. (Be´al et al., 2018). For all N ∈ N , (N, v) ∈
V(N), and α ∈ R, we have
ϕi(N, v)− ϕi(N, v + α · uN) = ϕj(N, v)− ϕj(N, v + α · uN) for all i, j ∈ N,
Be´al et al. (2018) axiomatized the proportional Shapley value by efficiency, dummy player
out, weak linearity and proportional monotonicity and contrasted it with an axiomatiza-
tion of the Shapley value by replacing proportional monotonicity with equal monotonicity.
The question arises whether it is also possible to contrast axiomatizations of the propor-
tional Harsanyi payoff with those of the Shapley value which differ only in one axiom. We
can show that the answer is yes. The proportional Harsanyi payoff is uniquely determined
by E, IGC and PP. PP preserves ratios for games which differ only in the grand coali-
tion. For such games EM preserves differences. It follows a “contrasted” axiomatization
of the Shapley value.
Theorem 7.1. Sh is the unique TU-value that satisfies E, IGC, and EM.
Proof. Since it is easy to check that all axioms in theorem 7.1 are satisfied we have only
to show uniqueness. Let (N, v) ∈ V(N) and let ϕ be a TU-value that satisfies E, IGC,
and EM. We use induction on the size |S|, S ⊆ N .
Initialization: If |S| = 1, uniqueness of ϕ(S, v) is satisfied by E.
Induction step: Assume uniqueness holds for |S| − 1, |S| ≥ 2 (IH). Then, by (IH), we
have
∑
R(S,R3i, Θϕi(R,v) is unique for all i ∈ S. By IGC, it follows ϕk(S, v −∆v(S) · uS)
is unique for all k ∈ S. By EM, we have for all i, j ∈ S
ϕi(S, v) = ϕi(S, v −∆v(S) · uS) + ϕj(S, v)− ϕj(S, v −∆v(S) · uS)
⇔
∑
k∈S
ϕk(S, v) =
∑
k∈S
ϕk(S, v −∆v(S) · uS) + |S| ·
[
ϕj(S, v)− ϕj(S, v −∆v(S) · uS)
]
and ϕ is unique for all S ⊆ N by E and Theorem 7.1 is shown.
Acknowledgments We are grateful to Andre´ Casajus for his helpful comments and sugges-
tions.
8. Appendix
We show the logical independence of the axioms used in the characterizations with at
least three axioms.
Remark 8.1. For all N ∈ N let (N, v) ∈ V(N) and λ ∈ Λ. The axioms in Theorems
4.1 and 5.2 are logically independent:
• E: The TU-value ϕ := 2Hλ satisfies IGC and Mλ/M but not E in general.
• IGC: The TU-value ϕλ, defined by ϕλi (N, v) := λN,i ·v(N) for all i ∈ N and all N ∈ N
satisfies E and Mλ/M but not IGC.
• Mλ/M: The multiweighted Shapley values MWSV satisfy E and IGC but not Mλ/M
in general.
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Remark 8.2. For all N ∈ N let (N, v) ∈ V(N). The axioms in Theorem 4.2 are logically
independent:
• E: The TU-value ϕ := 2Sh satisfy M, DVM, and IGC but not E.
• M: The multiweighted Shapley values satisfy E, DVM, and IGC but not M in general.
• DVM: The TU-values ϕc, defined by (12), satisfy E, M, and IGC but not DVM in
general.
• IGC: The equal division value ED, defined by EDi(N, v) := v(N)|N | for all i ∈ N , satisfies
E, M, and DVM but not IGC.
Remark 8.3. For all N ∈ N let (N, v) ∈ V++(N). The axioms in Theorem 6.10 and
corollary 6.12 are logically independent:
• D/E: The TU-value ϕ := 2Hp satisfies IGC and IS/PP but not D/E.
• IGC: The proportional value P satisfies D/E and IS/PP but not IGC.
• PP: The Shapley value Sh satisfies E/D and IGC but not IS/PP.
Remark 8.4. The axioms in Theorem 7.1 are logically independent:
• E: The TU-value ϕ := 2Sh satisfies IGC and EM but not E.
• IGC: The equal division value ED satisfies E and EM but not IGC.
• EM: Each weighted Shapley value Shw 6= Sh satisfies E and IGC but not EM.
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